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The recent proposals to enact an override clause to the Israeli Basic Law: Human Dignity
and Liberty has triggered a fierce public debate in Israeli legal and political circles. Under
this proposal, the Knesset could reenact a statute that was declared void by the courts.   As
is characteristic of such debates, the proponents and opponents of the override clause
claim to defend democracy, strengthen the protection of rights and defend restore the
proper balance between different branches of government. The purpose of this post is to
explain the background of this debate and evaluate the pros and cons of the override
clause in the Israeli context. Unfortunately for the reader, the author is not a neutral
observer of this debate. He clearly and unambiguously sides with the opponents of this
clause and yet, I hope to present a fair and a balanced description of the controversy.
The first section provides a background for the debate. The second section describes the
history of the debate and the political context in which it is conducted and the third section
examines the pros and cons of the override clause.
The Basic Laws of Israel and its Constitutional Foundations
Israel has no written constitution. Despite numerous efforts to enact a written constitution,
no such constitution has been enacted. Yet during its history several 'basic laws' have been
enacted. Most of the basic laws are designed to specify the institutional structure of the
state and the powers of the different branches of government. Only in 1992 the Israeli
Knesset passed two basic laws designed to protect rights: Basic law: Human Dignity and
Liberty, and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. The full text of all Israeli basic laws can
be found here
The passing of these two basic laws has been regarded by some as a dramatic legal event
– a radical transformation of the legal foundations of Israel and is therefore described as a
'constitutional revolution.' This term is used for two reasons. First, Basic Law: Human
Dignity and Liberty includes broad provisions protecting 'life body and dignity' in sections 2
and 4, property in section 3 and privacy and intimacy in section 7(a). Note however that
this Basic Law does not protect (or at least does not explicitly protects) some rights which
are almost universally protected in bills of rights such as freedom of expression, freedom of
religion, equality etc. Second, section 8 to the Basic Law declares that: "There shall be no
violation of rights under this Basic Law except by a law befitting the values of the State of
Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than is required." Hence
this basic law explicitly recognized that its provisions bind the Knesset itself and can be
construed to establish for the first time in Israel rights-based judicial review. The basic law
was passed by the Knesset in a regular non-ceremonial legislative process. It was
supported by thirty two Knesset members (out of a hundred and twenty), opposed by
twenty one and one Knesset member abstained.
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For reasons too peculiar to explain to a foreign reader, in 1994 Basic Law: Freedom of
Occupation was amended, and an override clause was added to it, but no such clause was
added to Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. In the same year, in one of the lengthiest
judgments ever made by the Court (which is not known for the brevity of its judgments), the
Court decided in United Mizrachi Bank v. Migdal Cooperative Village that Basic Law:
Human Dignity and Liberty grants the courts the power of judicial review. Statues that
conflict with this basic law should be declared void by the courts. The decision has been
compared to the famous US Marbury v. Madison decision in which the US Supreme Court
declared that it has the power to declare statutes void.
The growing power of the Israeli Supreme Court especially under the leadership of the
charismatic leadership of its former President Justice Aharon Barak and its alleged
'activism' raised hostile reactions on the part of certain segments of the public. The
enactment of the basic laws was only one reason for this opposition. In addition the Court
eroded the requirement of standing and used often non-literal interpretation designed to
protect basic human rights. The willingness of the Court to protect rights of ethnic
minorities, women and gays has been depicted as sectarian, leftist and anti-religious. The
opposition to the growing power of the Court was not limited to right-wing political activists.
Although generally the legal community has been sympathetic to the 'constitutional
revolution', prominent legal academics (e.g., professors Ruth Gavison and Daniel
Friedman) expressed reservations concerning the powers of the courts on the grounds that
judicial review is anti-democratic; that the Knesset had no power to enact constitutional
provisions, and that the process by which the basic laws have been enacted is not
appropriate to the enactment of foundational constitutional provisions as no public debate
preceded the enactment of the two basic laws and only a minority of Knesset members
supported these laws.
The Override Debate
Numerous legislative initiatives designed to limit the powers of the Court took place in the
last twenty years. In recent years the main efforts have been made to enact an override
clause to the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. The primary advocates of these
proposals have been members of the Likud, the Jewish Home party (a rightwing nationalist-
religious party) and the ultra-orthodox parties. In 2014 the Supreme Court declared that a
statute empowering the government to send asylum seekers to detention centers is
unconstitutional. As a result a prominent member of the Jewish Home party MK Ayelet
Shaked submitted a proposal for an override clause which was approved by the former
government but never submitted to the Knesset. Under this proposal, after the Court
declares that a statute is void the Knesset could, if it wishes to do so, reenact the statute if
it is supported by a simple majority of the all Knesset members.
The political pressure to enact an override clause led the Jewish Home party to include this
issue in the coalitional agreement with the Likud. This agreement specified that the Likud
and the Jewish Home Party will support the enactment of an override clause. Yet a third
component of the current coalition Kulanu party led by Moshe Kahlon is not bound by this
agreement.
2/4
In September 2017 two ministers of the Jewish Home party published a proposal to enact
an override clause which will empower the Knesset to reenact statutes declared void by the
Court by a simple majority of all Knesset members (61 Knesset members). In April 2018,
as a result of the asylum seekers crisis, the Likud and the Jewish Home party drafted a
proposal to enact an override clause which was submitted to the government and was
approved by it. The chair of the Jewish Home and the Minister of Education Mr. Naftali
Bennett and the Minister of Justice Ms. Ayelet Shaked declared after the vote that the
proposed override clause will strengthen the Israeli democracy. Yet the chair of the Kulanu
party Mr. Moshe Kahlon expressed his firm opposition to the override clause. To resolve
the deadlock some politicians proposed that the majority required to reenact a statutes
declared void by the Court would be larger (e.g., seventy or seventy five). Yet the Jewish
Home members of the coalition rejected this compromise.
The proposal for an override clause has been criticized by the opposition as well as by
numerous non-governmental organizations and prominent lawyers. In an unprecedented
declaration the President of the Supreme Court Ms. Esther Hayut denounced the override
clause and warned that it will leave basic human rights unprotected. The Attorney General
also expressed his dissatisfaction with the proposal. 47 prominent legal academics signed
a petition condemning the proposal; former and current deans of law schools have also
signed a similar petition. The Israeli bar has been silent but a large group of prominent
lawyers published an ad in Haaretz expressing their opposition to the proposal. An
influential think tank – The Israeli Democracy Institute – published several announcements
condemning the initiative. Last, Alan Dershowitz – a prominent US lawyer who has closed
ties with the Israeli establishment – warned that it will be tragic if the override clause is
enacted. The proposal has been supported primarily by right-wing organizations. The
rightwing think tank Kohelet Policy Forum expressed its support for the initiative, and so did
the movement for Governability and Democracy.
The Pros and Cons of an Override
The advocates of the override clause raise both formal and substantive arguments in its
favor. Formally they argue that the enactment of the basic laws in 1992 was not
characteristic of the enactment of foundational constitutional provisions. No referendum
has been conducted; no public debate has preceded their enactment, and they were
enacted by a simple majority of the Knesset members present in the vote. Further it is
claimed that the Israeli courts have been too aggressive and activist. Hence the frequent
accusation that Israel is governed by a court rather than by its legislature. Under the view of
the advocates of the override clause, the activism of the Court undermines governability
and frustrates the democratic foundations of the nation. Some proponents of the override
clause adopt the Canadian metaphor of a 'dialogue' between the legislative and the judicial
branch and argue that such a dialogue provides a fertile ground for public deliberation. Last
proponents of the override clause point to foreign legal systems that adopted the override
clause or similar provisions, in particular Canada and Britain.
Opponents point out that the override clause will endanger the protection of rights in Israel
and will undermine the proper balance among the branches of government. They point out
two major reasons why comparisons with foreign systems are irrelevant: the distinctive
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institutional structure of Israel and the uniqueness of its cultural context. With respect to the
former it is claimed that passing legislation in Israel is particularly easy.  Israel has only one
house of Parliament, and typically the government has a majority in the Knesset. Hence in
practice a majority of 61 members (required under the proposal to reenact a statute)
practically grants power to the government to enact anything it wishes to. Israel is also not
a member of the European Union and is not subject to its human rights treaties or, for that
matter, is not subject to the jurisdiction of any international human rights court.
In addition opponents of the override clause point out that the protection of rights in Israel is
precarious due to specific cultural and contextual reasons. The permanent concerns of
security, the prominence of religion in Israel, the lack of stable democratic traditions and the
persistent tensions among different ethnic and religious communities threaten the stability
of Israeli democracy. Under such circumstances undermining the powers of the courts is
far more dangerous in Israel than in other western democracies.
Further, one should recall that the override clause is only one of many proposals that are
designed to weaken the power of dissent and strengthen the powers of government in
Israel. Among such proposals one should mention the proposal to weaken activist NGO’s
by restricting foreign funding; the Jewish State Bill which is designed to emphasize the
Jewish character of the state at the expense of rights of minorities and numerous other
proposals. While none of these proposals in itself can undermine the Israeli democracy the
accumulation of such proposals poses a critical threat to the robustness of the protection of
rights in Israel. It is the popularity of such proposals and the competition among different
members of the Knesset to raise even more extreme proposals that is particularly
worrisome for liberals in Israel.
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